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DOE FOR NA-24
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015

TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) RUSSIAN CLOSING PLENARY
STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 9, 2005

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-052.

12. (U) The text at paragraph 3 is the official translation
of the Russian statement that was delivered at the closing
plenary meeting of Part II of the Twenty-seventh Session of
the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
(JCIC), held at the Russian Mission on November 9, 2005.

13. (S) Begin text:

Official Translation

JCIC-XXVII

STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
at the Plenary Meeting
November 9, 2005

Esteemed Colleagues,

If we had to use one word to characterize the session of our Commission that is concluding today, it would be "businesslike." Indeed, most of the issues that we considered both this time and during the first half of the session early last summer are strictly practical in nature. It is pleasant to note that we succeeded in resolving some of these issues and laying a good foundation for resolving a number of others, we hope, in the foreseeable future.

On the plus side there has been a positive step such as the adoption of the JCIC Joint Statement on First Stages of SS-25 ICBMs Burned without Nozzles Attached. We trust that this will be followed by yet another necessary step--the withdrawal of U.S. claims about the procedures for Russia's elimination of ICBMs of this type at Votkinsk, procedures that are strictly in accord with the Treaty requirements.

The Russian side made a significant contribution to resolving issues of the same type related to reentry vehicle inspections of U.S. Trident II SLBMs and Russian SS-25 ICBMs.

We submitted a serious new proposal aimed at removing the well-known U.S. concern regarding SS-25 ICBMs. The clarifications we provided during the special briefing graphically illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed demonstration. We are prepared to arrange the demonstration in an expeditious manner. A positive response from the U.S. side to this proposal would make it possible, on the basis of reciprocity, to close out similar issues concerning reentry vehicle inspections for both SS-25 ICBMs and Trident II SLBMs. In order to expedite achievement of this goal the Russian side makes the following Coordinated Statement (attached text is read).

We believe that the Parties have made significant progress toward resolving the problem of inspecting U.S. SLBMs in liners and loading tubes, which has been on the Commission's agenda for a long time. However, the work was not completed. Nevertheless, we heard the U.S. side's statement regarding its desire to do this during the break between sessions. We hope that we will finally close out this issue as well.

It is regrettable that for some reason less attention was devoted to resolving problems that have for many years made Treaty implementation more onerous. The Russian delegation was prepared for such work.

In this connection, I would like to remind you of issues which, we believe, are already close to resolution, such as the procedure for elimination of U.S. Peacekeeper ICBMs and the production of the Castor 120 missile stage in the U.S. We note the statement the U.S. side made in this context at

the Plenary Meeting (sic) on November 7 of this year, that the U.S. currently has no plans to eliminate its existing Peacekeeper ICBMs. We believe that closing out these two problems is entirely feasible. The Russian side has done a great deal to achieve that. It is now up to the United States to take reciprocal steps.

It is also regrettable that we were unable to consider in greater detail the question of U.S. actions regarding the five silo ICBM launchers at Vandenberg. In essence what we have here is the creation of a serious new problem by the United States in terms of Treaty compliance. After all, U.S. actions at Vandenberg quite clearly do not fit in with the fundamental requirements of the Treaty, specifically that each ICBM launcher must be capable of launching only an ICBM of the type specified for it in the Memorandum of Understanding and that a space launch facility is a facility from which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs and SLBMs. We are compelled to keep these and several other issues on the Commission's agenda.

As before, the Russian side will be prepared to actively utilize diplomatic channels to consider issues related to Treaty implementation and urges the other Parties to do the same.

In conclusion, allow me to thank all the participants in this session for businesslike cooperation and a friendly atmosphere at our meetings and during our interaction in general. I wish everyone a good trip home.

End text.

14. (U) Taylor sends.
Moley